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Abstract Attribute-based Keyword Search (ABKS)
support the access control on the search result based
upon fuzzy identity over encrypted data, when the
search operation is performed over outsourced encrypt-
ed data in cloud. However, almost ABKS schemes trust
a single authority to monitor the attribute key for
users. In practice, we usually have different entities
responsible for monitoring different attribute keys to
a user. Thus, it is not realistic to trust a single
authority to monitor all attributes keys for ABKS
scheme in practical situation. Although a large body
of ABKS schemes have been proposed, few works
have been done on multi-authority attribute searchable
encryption. We propose a multi-authority attribute
searchable encryption without central authority in this
paper. Comparing previous ABKS schemes, we extend
the single authority ABKS scheme to multi-authority
ABKS scheme and remove the central authority in
multi-authority ABKS scheme. We analyze our scheme
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in terms of security and efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Cloud computing has been widely recognized as the
next big thing in this era. Outsourcing data to cloud
servers, while providing service economic savings and
various convenience for users. Cloud server may be
honest but curious, in order to ensure the security, data
is usually stored as encrypted form in the cloud. At the
same time, it also brings a new question that how users
get encrypted data without decrypt of them. Searchable
encryption is a primitive, which enables data users to
search over the encrypted data. Both keywords privacy
and data privacy are protected in this procedure.
Recently, Li and Zhang (2014) proposed an ABKS
scheme in which a data owner can control the search
result and outsource encrypted data according to the
access control policy. Attribute-based keyword search
scheme can be generated based on attribute-based
encryption(ABE) scheme. Sahai and Waters (2005)
proposed a fuzzy identity encryption scheme in which
the sender can encrypt the message by the specified
attribute set (user’s fuzzy identity) with the threshold
value d, such that only the authorized person with at
least d of the given attribute can decrypt the message.
In order to get the attribute key corresponding to each
attribute, authorized persons must go to the trustwor-
thy attribute authority to prove that they have these
attributes. This means we must trust a single attribute
authority to issue the authorized persons attribute
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keys all of records such as ID number, drive license
number, and student number etc. But in practice, we
usually have many attribute authorities responsible for
monitoring different attribute keys of a person (ID
number is managed by the Public Security Bureau,
student number is managed by the School Office and
driving license number is managed by Department of
Motor Vehicles. For this reason, many multi-authority
ABE schemes (Lin et al (2008); Chase and Chow (2009);
Chow (2010); Xu et al (2016))are proposed.
In an ABKS scheme, ciphertexts and authorized
persons attribute keys are labeled with sets of descrip-
tive attributes. Authorized persons attribute keys are
distributed by attribute authority. Similar with ABE,
ABKS scheme also trust a single attribute authority to
issue the authorized persons attribute keys. Obviously,
single attribute authority is not practical in real life and
increase the burden of attribute authority work.
Considering a scenario: Patients upload the encrypt-
ed Personal Health Record (PHR) to the cloud server.
It allows efficient sharing of medical information among
researchers while we should keep the data security.
Meanwhile, it must be achieved fine grained access
control of data and support the search operation.
For the attribute set{Medical Association Membership,
Chief Physician, Medical Researcher, Police}, there
are four different entities, charged by the {Medical
Association, Hospital, Scientific Research Institution
and Public Security Bureau} respectively. It is difficult
to solve it by single authority. How to design a search-
able encryption scheme to guarantee the confidentiality
of PHR data and allow authorized person to search
encrypted data in multi-authority environment is a
challenging problem.
1.1 Related works
Song et al (2000) proposed the first keyword search on
ciphertext with symmetric encryption methold. It can
only support single keyword search and search requires
linearly scan each file document word by word. The
most important thing is that it is not fully secure
and only supports user-sever-user model. After this pa-
per, many searchable encryption schemes(Goh (2003);
Curtmola et al (2006); Chang and Mitzenmacher
(2005)) focusing on this model based on symmetric
encryption. Symmetric searchable encryption schemes
only supports user-sever-user model and unsuitable for
three party situation, which is unsuitable in the cloud
environment. Boneh et al (2004) solved this problem
and proposed the first public key encryption keyword
search(PEKS). Their scheme provides a solution for
the third party user to search on the encrypted data.
However, Boneh’s scheme requires a secure channel and
can not achieve indistinguish of trapdoor. Following
Boneh’s work, Baek et al (2008) designed a PEKS
scheme without secure channel by adding key pairs
for the cloud server. Park et al (2004) proposed a
conjunctive keyword search scheme based on PEKS
scheme and solved the shortcomings of single keyword
and increase the scheme practicality. But it can not
ensure the security of trappdoor indistinguishability
and keyword guess attack. Abdalla al (2008) proposed a
new definition consistency of keyword search in cipher-
text and designed a new PEKS scheme from identity
based encryption. Golle et al (2004) proposed the
conjunctive keyword searchable encryption. Although
Golle’s scheme belonged to the symmetric searchable
encryption, it also supports multi-keyword search.
Sahai and Waters (2005) proposed a transformation
from IBE to ABE. Then following Sahai’s researcher,
Goyal et al (2006) proposed a key policy attribute
based encryption(KP-ABE) scheme which supports
any monotonic access formula. ABE has two forms
of encryption, one called KP-ABE, another called
cipher policy attribute based encryption(CP-ABE).
KP-ABE is that the key decides the access control
policy, while ciphertext and attribute are associated.
CP-ABE is that the ciphertext decides the access
control policy, while key and attribute are associated.
Bethencourt et al (2007) proposed the first CP-ABE
scheme, which supports tree-based access structure.
Recently, many attribute based encryption schemes(Li
et al (2017); Ma et al (2016); Wang et al (2016,
2017)) have been proposed, but they only support single
authority. Chase and Chow (2009) made extension to
Sahai and Waters scheme from another view. They
proposed a multi-authority ABE scheme that achieves
the practical requirements. Following the Chase’s work
Chase and Chow (2009), many researchers focus on
multi-authority ABE schemes(Xu et al (2016); Zhong
et al (2016))that satisfy the practical requirements.
For resisting collusion attack between attribute author-
ities. Lin et al (2008) proposed the multi-authority
ABE scheme without the central authority, but it can
only achieves m resiliance. Chow (2010) proposed a
new privacy-preserving architecture for multi authority
ABE without a central authority.
Searchable encryption gives a method to securely
searching operation on encrypted data in cloud envi-
ronment. When the Data owner uploads the encrypted
data and shares the data privately to the third party
user, it should first know the third party users identity
in order to encrypt data with the corresponding encryp-
tion key. Han et al (2014) proposed an ABKS scheme
that ensures attribute privacy and supports multi-user
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situation. Recently, many attribute based encryption
with keyword search schemes(Shi et al (2014); Li and
Zhang (2014); Liu et al (2014); Zheng et al (2014);
Wang et al (2013); Koo et al (2013)) have been
proposed, but they only support single keyword search
and these schemes also leak the receivers identity. Liu et
al (2016); Xhafa et al (2014) proposed a single-authority
ABE with fuzzy keyword search scheme respectively.
For searching operation over ABE, it is not realistic to
trust a single authority to monitor all attributes keys in
practical situation. In multi-authority ABE scheme, the
central authority can assign a portion of the decryption
key according to the user’s global identifier. Once the
central authority is broken, the security does not exist.
So, how to design the multi-authority ABKS scheme
without a trusted central authority is a challenging
problem.
1.2 Our contribution
We propose a model of multi-authority attribute search-
able encryption scheme in which a data owner can
encrypt keywords specifying an attribute set, such that
only an authorized person who has adequate attribute
keys from authorities can search and decrypt the
message in cloud environment. In our multi-authority
attribute searchable encryption scheme, we assume that
attributes can be divided into n disjoint sets. Each
set will be mastered by a different authority. The
main idea of our scheme is to find a way to extend
the single authority ABKS scheme to multi- authority
ABKS scheme. We make the following contributions
over existing research:
A general transformation from multi-authority ABE
to multi-authority ABKS is proposed. We also give a
concrete multi-authority ABKS without central author-
ity scheme based on the multi-authority ABE.
The scheme supports the access control based upon
fuzzy identity over the search result and provides a
multi-authority attribute searchable encryption with
multi-owner/multi-user architecture, achieves the secu-
rity of user anonymity, indistinguishes of keywords and
trapdoor, keyword guessing attack.
1.3 Organizations
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as
follows: Some necessary preliminaries are provided for
the proposed schemes in section 2. We analyze the
relationship between multi-authority ABE and multi-
authority ABKS schemes in section 3. The multi-ABKS
scheme is proposed and analyzed in section 4. The
security and performance comparison are performed
and analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes this
paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the formal definition of
access tree and access structure. Then we give the
description of pseudorandom functions, anonymous key
issuing, the bilinear map and complexity assumptions.
2.1 Access control structure
We use the access structure of the tree Υ . Each non-
leaf node of the access structure tree can be described
by its children node and a threshold value. nx denotes
the number of children node x and kx represents the
threshold value, then 0 < kx ≤ nx. The tree leaf node
associated with a attribute value att(x) and kx = 1.
In order to simply the operation of the access tree.
We define some functions about access tree. Function
parent(x) denote the node x of parent node. We build
an children node index for every node and children node
index number from 1 to nx. Another function index(x)
return node x number. r denote root of the access tree
and Υx denote subtree root at the node x. Hence Υ can
be denote as Υr. If Υr(γ) = 1, it is denoted a set of
attributes satisfy the access tree. We take recursively
way to compute Υx(γ), if x is a non-leaf node, evaluate
all children nodes values Υx′(γ), returns 1 if and only if
at least kx children node return 1. If x is a leaf node,
then Υx(γ) returns 1 if and only if att(x) ∈ Υ .
2.2 Pseudorandom functions
We use techniques for distributed pseudorandom func-
tions (PRF) similar in Chase and Chow (2009). The
main purpose is to use the PRF to make the key
user-specific (otherwise, user can share their keys from
the authority to their friend). So the work require
that every user have a unique global identifier and
prove that it is the owner of the global identifier.
But the user presents the same global identifier to the
authority, it is easy to build a complete file about
global identifier for all authorities. Alternatively, we
can interact with a server via a pseudorandom function
and obtain attributes keys without revealing one’s full
global identifier. In Chase and Chow (2009), they use
the anonymous key issuing to protect the user privacy.
In this anonymous credential system, the user can get
and prove the credential while remaining anonymous.
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2.3 Bilinear map and complexity assumptions
We give formal definitions on bilinear map and our
complexity assumptions. Let G1, G2 and GT are three
cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p. A bilinear
map e : G1 ×G2 → GT .
which satisfies:
1. Bilinear: For any x, y ∈ Zp, h ∈ G1, j ∈ G2,
e(hx, jy) = e(h, j)xy.
2. Non-degenerate:exist h ∈ G1, j ∈ G2, e(h, j) 6= 1.
Assumption 1 (HDH). The Hash Diffile-Hellman
problem: given the four tuple (g, gx, gy, H(gz) and hash
function H, x, y, z ∈ Zp, G =< g >, decide z =
xy(modp) whether or not.
Assumption 2 (DBDH). The Decisional Bilinear







2 , Z), x, y, z ∈ Zp, Z ∈ GT , G1 =< g1 >,
G2 =< g2 >, decide Z = e(g1, g2)
xyz whether or not.
Assumption 3 (BDH). The Bilinear Diffile-Hellman






2), x, y, z ∈
Zp, G1 =< g1 >, G2 =< g2 >, compute the value
Z = e(g1, g2)
xyz ∈ GT .
Assumption 4 (XDH). The external Diffle-Hellman
assumption: the DDH problem is hard in G1 and
isomorphism Φ′ : G1 → G2 is not exist.
Assumption 5 (q-DDHI). The q-Decisional Diffile-
Hellman Inversion(q-DDHI) problem: given the q + 2




, gy), G =< g >, decide y = 1/x
whether or not.
In this paper, we construct a multi-authority ABKS
scheme based on these assumptions.
3 Multi-authority ABE and Multi-authority
ABKS
3.1 Multi-authority ABE Scheme Definition
Now, we will discuss the multi-authority ABE and give
a general transformation from multi-authority ABE to
multi-authority ABKS. A general multi-authority ABE
scheme include four algorithms:
◦ Setup(λ,N) → (pa, (PKi, SKi){i=1...N}): This al-
gorithm inputs the number of authorities N and a
security parameter λ, the system outputs a public
parameter pa and N key pairs (PKi, SKi){i=1...N},
every key pairs for one attribute authority.
◦ Enc(M,pa,Ai{i=1...N}) → CT : The Data sender
inputs the set of attributes Ai, the message M
and the the public parameter pa, computes the
ciphertext CT , Where Ai represents a subset of
attributes controlled by the attribute authority i.
◦ KeyGen(GID,Ai, SKi{i=1...N}, Υ ) → mski: This
algorithm inputs the user’s identity GID, the user
attributes set Ai, the authority secret key SKi and
the access structure Υ , outs a decryption key mski
corresponding the access structure.
◦ Dec(CT, pa,mski{i=1...N}) → M : This algorithm
inputs the ciphertext CT , the system public param-
eter pa and the user decryption key mski. Outputs
the message M , if attributes satisfies the access
structure tree.
3.2 Security Model
About the security in N-authority ABE scheme, we can
define against compromising at most n authorities by
the experiment as follows:
ExpN−ABE−saaN−ABE (λ)
A → (Icorr ⊂ [1, N ], AC = {AC1 , ......ACN});
if |Icorr| > n, Then return 0;
φ→ Ui, i /∈ Icorr;
Setup(λ,N)→ (pa, {PKi, SKi}{i=1...N});
AKeyGenO(find′, pa, PKi{i=1...N}, SKi{i∈Icorr})
→ (m∗0,m∗1);
Enc(Ac,m∗b)→ CT , b ∈ {0, 1};
AKeyGenO(′guess′, CT , st)→ b′;
if b = b′, then 0 else return 1.
The attribute-key generation oracle AKeyGenO is
defined as:
if(i ∈ Icorr), return ⊥;
if(∃Au′i s.t. (GID,Au
′
i ) ∈ Ui), return⊥;
if(|Au′i
⋂
ACi | ≥ dk)
∧
{∀j 6= k, [(j ∈ Icorr)⋃
(∃Auj s.t.((GID,Au
′




AjC | ≥ dj))]},
return ⊥;
Ui ∪ (GID,Aui )→ Ui, return AKeyGenO.
Definition 1 (Selective-attribute attack): An N-
authority ABE scheme can against selective-attribute
attack if for any probability polynomial time adversary
A, there is a neglible function ε(λ) such that
AdvsaaA = |Pr[Exp
N−ABE−saa
N−ABE (λ) = 1]| ≤ ε(λ).
3.3 Multi-authority ABKS
In this section, we will propose a general construc-
tion method and security reduction for multi-authority
ABKS through study of multi-authority ABE. Data
owners encrypt the keyword set with attribute sets.
Data users get the user key from attribute authorities,
and server matches the ciphertext with trapdoor, figure
1 shows the entire system framework. A multi-authority
ABKS scheme consists algorithms as follows:
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◦ Setup(λ,N,U) → (gp, PKi, SKi, PKs, SKs): This
algorithm inputs the number of authorities N , a
security parameter λ and the attributes universe U ,
the system outputs the public parameter gp, the
sever public and secret key pairs (PKs, SKs) and
attribute authority key pairs (PKi, SKi){i=1...N},
every key pairs for one attribute authority.
◦ Keygen(N,U, u, Υ ) →mski: This algorithm takes
the number of attribute authorities, the attributes
universe U , user identity u and the access structure
Υ , outputs the decryption key mski, {i = 1...N},
corresponding the access structure Υ .
◦ Enc(gp,M,W,PKs, Ai) → CT : The Data owner
inputs the set of attributes Ai, the sever public
key PKs, the message M , the keywords W , and
the system public parameter gp, computes the
ciphertext CT .
◦ Trapdoor(W,mski, PKs) → TW : The Data user
inputs keyword W , the attribute key mski, the
server public key PKs, and computes trapdoor TW
corresponding the access structure.
◦ Test(TW , CT, SKS) → 1 or 0: The server inputs
the ciphertext CT , a trapdoor TW and the server
secret key SKs. If the ciphertext attributes satisfy
the access structure tree, outputs 1, else outputs 0.
◦ Dec(CT, gp,mski{i=1...N}) → M : The Data user
inputs the ciphertext CT , the system public pa-
rameter gp and the user key mski, outputs the
message M , if attributes ciphertext satisfies the
access structure tree.
3.4 Security Model of Multi-authority ABKS
About N-authority ABEKS scheme, we can define by
the selective-attribute ciphertext attack experiments as
follows:
◦ Setup: A is assumed to be an polynomial time
attack algorithm, running time is bounded by t. A
give the challenge attribute sets γ to the challenger.
The public parameter are given to the A.
◦ Phase 1-1: A makes the queries of the trapdoor
Tw, adaptively makes the attribute keys queries for
corresponding to any access structures tree Υ , where
attribute set γ is not satisfy access structures tree Υ .
◦ Phase 1-2: A gives challenger B two be challenged
keywords, w0 and w1. B randomly picks bit b,
and computes a attribute ciphertext for wb under
attribute sets γ and returns it to A.
◦ Phase 1-3: A continues making trapdoor queries
of the form w and the attacker can not ask for the
trapdoors w0 and w1.
◦ Phase 1-4: A outputs its guess b′.
In this attack experiments, the advantage of the adver-
sary A is:
AdvsacaA = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2|.
Definition2 (Selective-attribute ciphertext attack):
An N-authority ABKS scheme is secure against selective-
attribute ciphertext attack if for any probability poly-
nomial time adversary A, there is a neglible function
ε(λ) such that
AdvsacaA = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| ≤ ε(λ).
About N-authority ABEKS scheme, we can define
by the trapdoor indistinguishability experiments as
follows:
◦ Setup: A is assumed to be an polynomial time
attack algorithm, running time is bounded by t, the
public parameter and sever public key are given to
the A.
◦ Phase 1-1:Amakes the queries of the trapdoor Tw,
adaptively makes the attribute keys corresponding
to any access structures tree Υ .
◦ Phase 1-2: A gives challenger B two be challenged
keywords, w0 and w1. B randomly picks bit b, and
computes a trapdoor Twb for wb under attribute sets
γ and returns it to A.
◦ Phase 1-3: A continues making trapdoor queries
of the form w and the attacker can not ask for the
trapdoors w0 and w1.
◦ Phase 1-4: A outputs its guess b′.
The advantage of the adversary A in this game is
defined as:
AdvTrapdoorindistinguishabilityA = |Pr[b = b
′]− 1/2|.
Definition3 (Trapdoor indistinguishability): An N-
authority ABKS scheme is trapdoor indistinguishabili-
ty secure for any probability polynomial time adversary
A, there is a neglible function ε(λ) such that
AdvTrapdoorindistinguishabilityA = |Pr[b = b
′]−1/2| ≤ ε(λ).
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Fig. 1 Multi-authority ABKS
4 A concrete Multi-authority ABKS scheme
4.1 Scheme Description
We will give a concrete a multi-authority ABKS scheme
that is based on the above multi-authority ABE scheme.
This scheme consists algorithms as follows:
• Setup(λ,N,=, U): This algorithm inputs the num-
ber of authorities N , a security parameter 1=, and
the attributes universe U , the system outputs a
system parameter
gp = {e, q, g, g0, g1, g2, G1, G2, GT , H,H1, H2}, (1)
G1, G2 and GT are three cyclic multiplicative
groups of prime order p, g, g1 ∈ G1, g1 = gy, g0, g2 ∈
G2, g2 = g
∂
0 , y, ∂ ∈ Zp∗ , H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → GT , the server public
and secret key pairs
(PKs, SKs) = (g
a
2 , a) (2)
the user secret key
SKu = ∂ (3)
and N master key pairs
(MPKi,MSKi) = (Yi, vi) = (e(g1, g2)
vi , vi), (4)
{i = 1...N}, every key pairs for one attribute au-
thority. For each attribute j ∈ {1, 2, ....ni}, au-
thority i picks xi, ti,j ∈ Zp, each authority i stores
attribute private key
< xi, {si,t}t∈{1,2...N}\{i}, {tij} >, (5)
sit is only know to authority {i, t}, si,t = st,i.
Finally the system outputs the authority public
parameters as follows:
< Y = e(g1, g2)
∑
i vi ,
{yi = gxi , T1,ij = g
tij
1 , T2,ij = g
tij
0 } > .
(6)
• Keygen(N,U, u, Υ ): Each user u invokes an anony-
mous key distribution protocol and obtains the at-
tribute key as follows: authority i randomly chooses
Rit ∈ Zp and computes
Dit = g
Rit
1 PRFit(u), PRFit(u) = g
xixt/sit+u, i > t
Dit = g
Rit
1 /PRFit(u), PRFit(u) = g
xixt/sit+u, i < t









(i, t) ∈ {1, 2, ....N} × {1, 2, ....N}\{i}.
(7)
Anonymous key issuing protocol is similar in Chase’s
paper. Authority i chooses a degree di polynomial
at random








for the user u attribute j.
About attribute keys D(x) and Rx corresponds
the tree Υ , user first defines a polynomial qx for
each node x. These polynomials are started from
the root node r to leaf node. First for each node
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x, user sets polynomial qx degree dx = kx − 1,
which dx is the threshold value. Now user sets value
qr(0) = y and chooses other qr polynomial points
at random. So, the qr polynomial has been defined
completely. For any other node x similar with root
node r, sets qx(0) = qparentx(index(x)) and chooses
random other points of the polynomial qx to define
it completely.
According to the above method, user defines the
polynomial completely. User gives the value D(x)
and Rx to the user for each leaf node x:
D(x) = gqx(0)T rx1,ij , Rx = g
rx
1 , (9)
which rx is randomly choose in ZP . Finally authori-
ties outputs the attribute key mski = (Dx, Rx, Du,
Sij) for the user, i ∈ {1, 2, ....N}.
• Enc(M,W,PKs, Ai{i=1...N}): The Data owner takes
the set of attributes Ai, the keywords set W and the
server public key PKS , chooses random numbers s
and computes:
E0 = MY
s, E1 = g
s





j ∈ Ai{i=1...N}, E2 = H2(t) · e(g1, g2)s,
t = e(H1(W ), PK
s




• Trapdoor(W,mski, PKs, SKu): Data user inputs
keyword W , the attribute key mski, the server
public key PKs, the user secret SKu = ∂ , chooses
random number r′ and computes trapdoor
T1 = H1(W ) ·H(PKr
′
s ), T2 = g
r′





x, TW = [T1, T2, T3, T4].
(11)
• Test(TW , CT, SKs): Server inputs the ciphertext
CT , a trapdoor TW and the server secret key SKs.
When the ciphertext attribute satisfy the access
structure tree γ. Algorithm can compute Zx =
e(T3, E1)/e(T4, Cij) = e(g, g2)
sqx(0), when the node
x is a leaf node. If x is a non-leaf node: computes
the node v that are children of x


























Server takes recursively way to compute and get the
value e(g, g2)
sy = e(g1, g2)






or not. If they are equal, output 1 else 0.
• Dec(CT, pa,Dx, Rx, Du, Sij): For each authority
i ∈ [1, 2...N ]: for any di attributes i ∈ ACi
⋂
ACu ,
where Au denotes the attribute set of the data
user, compute e(Sij , Cij)
∂ = e(g1, g2)
spi(j). Inter-
polate all the valuese(g1, g2)
spi(j) to get Bi =
e(g1, g2)
spi(0), multiply Bi together to get C =
Y s/e(Du, g
s
2) and compute e(Du, E3) · C = Y s,
finally data user can recover M by E0/Y
s.
Correctness: When assuming the ciphertext {E0, E1,
Cij , j ∈ Ai{i=1...N}, E2, E3} is valid for W ′ and the
trapdoor TW for W , we can verify Test algorithm
correctness as:
For node x, when i = att(x), according to the above










test whether two values are equal by W and W ′.
4.2 Security proof
The following theorem shows that the scheme is indis-
tinguishes of keywords secure.
Theorem 1: Suppose the BDH problem is hard in
group G2, the multi-authority ABKS is secure under
selective attribute ciphertext model attack.
Proof : Security proof similar paper Goyal et al (2006),
adversary A is an an polynomial time attack algo-
rithm can breake the muti-authority ABKS with the
advantage ε . We construct an algorithm B that solves
the BDH problem with ε′ = ε/eqT qH2 , qT and qH2
are hash function queries to trapdoor and H2. Let
G1 =< g1 >. Algorithm B is given g1, ga2 , gb2, gc2 ∈ G1.
It’s goal is to output v = e(g1, g2)
abc ∈ GT . Challenger
randomly chooses d ∈ {0, 1}, output < ga2 , gb2, gc2, Z >.
When d = 1, challenger chooses Z = e(g1, g2)
abc, else
randomly chooses Z ∈ G2. Algorithm B simulates the
challenger and interact with adversary A as follows:
•Setup: Algorithm B invokes adversary algorithm
A choose attribute set , include elements in ZP ,
Algorithm B sets g′1 = ga2 , g′2 = gb2 and chooses
randomly tij , Bij . When i ∈ γ, tij = Bij , else tij 6= Bij .
• Attributes key queries: Adversary algorithm
A adaptively makes the attribute keys queries for the
attribute set γ is not satisfy access structures tree
Υ , Υ (γ) = 0. In order to generate keys, B must
access the tree for each non leaf node determines a
degree dx polynomial Qx(x), PolyUnsat(Υ (x), γ, g
λ(x))
is an algorithm for the root node x (attribute γ with
unsatisfied root node x access tree, Υ (γ) = 0). The
algorithm B inputs access tree Υ (x), set of attributes
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γ, an element gλ(x). Firstly, algorithm B defines root
node x polynomial qx, which degree is dx. Because
the attribute set is not satisfy access structures tree,
Υ (γ) = 0, no more than dx children of x are satisfied
the access structure tree. We assume that the children
of node x has kx children node x
′, which satisfies
attributes γ of the node x, the algorithm chooses
randomly point λ(x′) ∈ Zp, set qx(index(x′)) = λx′
and randomly choose point dx − kx, so qx is defined
completely. Finally, Algorithm B determines that the
polynomial order is dx . Notice that this when we
know the value gqx(0), gqx(index(x
′)) can be obtained by
interpolation and qx′(0) = qx(index(x
′)). Algorithm B
runs PolyUnsat(Υ (x), γ, gλ(x)) to define a polynomial
qx of degree dx for the node x and satisfy qr(0) = a.
For the leaf node, if x satisfy the attribute sets γ, then
algorithm can obtain qx(0), else algorithm can obtain
gqx(0).
Algorithm B defines Qx(.) = qx(.), y = Qr(0) = a.
We use the following polynomial to represent the key
of the leaf node:
i = att(x),






1 , choose randomly rx ∈ Zp,









1 , choose randomly rx ∈ Zp.
Therefore, we have successfully constructed the leaf
node’s private key for the access structure tree Υ .
Next, the adversary can access the random oracle
H,H1, ask the trapdoor queries for keyword w and
query execution similar paper (Boneh et al (2004); Rhee
et al (2010)).
• Challenge: adversary chooses two keywords w0
and w1 to the simulator algorithm B, the algorithm B
randomly chooses a bit b, chooses randomly c′ ∈ ZP
and returns ciphertext of mb:
C = (E0 = MY
c, E1 = g
′c
2 , Cij = g
′tij
1 , E2 = JZ,E3 =
g′c
′
2 ), Z is define an above phase.
More trapdoor queries: Adversary algorithm A
continues making trapdoor queries of the form w and
the attacker can not ask for the trapdoors w0 and w1.
algorithm B acts exactly as it did in attributes key
queries.
•Output: Adversary algorithm A outputs its guess
b′. When b = b′, the algorithm B outputs d′ = 0, else,
outputs d′ = 1. The advantage of the algorithm B in
the DBDH game is:
Pr[SuccesB ]
= 1/2Pr[d = d′|d = 0] + 1/2Pr[d6=d′|d = 1]− 1/2
= ε/2.
Since E1 = g
′c
2 , J = H2(e(H1(W ), PK
s
s ), security
proof similar paper Boneh et al (2004). Adversary
algorithm A can analyze query to H2(t) and the pair
(t, J) in an H2 list.
t = e(H1(wb), g
ac
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
ac(b+ab).
At this point, Algorithm B can output t/e(g1, g2)acab
as its guess for e(g1, g2)
abc, so the Algorithm B advan-
tage is at least ε′ = ε/eqT qH2 as required.
So, qH2 and qH1 are hash function queries, if ad-
versary A is an polynomial time attack algorithm can
breake the muti-authority ABKS with the advantage ε.
Then there is the attack algorithm can solve the DBDH
game and have probability overall is ε/2. In the case
of DBDH problem solvable, then there is the attack
algorithm can solve the BDH game and have probability
overall is ε′ = ε/eqT qH2 .
Hence, the proof of Theorem1 is completed. ut
An adversary can obtain trapdoor for any keyword
of his choice, even under this attack the adversary
can not indistinguish the encryption of two challenge
keywords for which he did not obtain the trapdoor.
Theorem 2: Multi-authority ABKS is an scheme
satisfies the trapdoor indistinguishability against a
chosen keyword attack, under assumption that Hash
Diffie-Hellman (HDH) is intractable.
Proof : Security proof similar paper Rhee et al (2010),
suppose an polynomial time malicious outside adver-
sary A is an an polynomial time attack algorithm
can break the trapdoor indistinguishability about the
muti-authority ABKS. We construct an algorithm B
that solves the HDH problem with ε′ = ε/2, qT is
hash function queries to trapdoor. Algorithm B is
given (g, ga, gb, η) ∈ G41 and H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ia a
hash function, where η is either H(gab) or a random
HDH challenge of G1. Challenger randomly chooses
d ∈ {0, 1}, output (g, ga, gb, η) ∈ G41, When d = 1,
we choose η = H(gab), else d = 0, choose a random
element η. Algorithm B simulates the challenger and
interact with adversary A as follows:
•Setup: Algorithm B randomly chooses l ∈ Z∗p and
sets the server key pairs (PKs, SKs) = (g
al, al). It
randomly chooses ∂′ ∈ Zp and sets the user secret key
SKu = ∂
′. Here, We define an unknown value a such
that SKS = a = al.
•Attributes key queries:Amakes trapdoor queries
of the form w and can not ask for the trapdoors w0 and
w1. Algorithm B acts as follows:
Algorithm B randomly chooses r′ ∈ Zp and com-
putes T ∗1 = H1(w)H((g
al)r
′
) and T2 = g
r′ , where l
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is selected values in the setup phase and Dx, Rx are
selected similar the Theorem 1.
Algorithm B responds to Algorithm A with the
trapdoor, Twi = [T1, T2, T3, T4] of wi.
•Challenge: Adversary algorithm A chooses two
keywords w0 and w1 to the simulator algorithm B.
The algorithm B randomly choose bit b, and returns
challenge trapdoor T ∗wb as follows:
The algorithm sets T ∗1 = H1(w)η, T
∗
2 = g







x , where l, r
′ is a selected value in the
setup phase and η is a component of the HDH challenge.
Algorithm B responds to Algorithm A with the








4 ] of wb. When the η =
H(gab), Twb is a valid challenge trapdoor wb.
More trapdoor queries: Adversary algorithm A
can continue to issue trapdoor queries of the form w
and the attacker can not ask for the trapdoors w0 and
w1. algorithm B acts exactly as it did in attributes key
queries.
• Output: Adversary algorithm A outputs its guess
b′. When b = b′, the simulator algorithm B outputs
d′ = 0, meaning that η = H(gab), else, output
d′ = 1, meaning that η 6=H(gab). The advantage of
the algorithm B in the HDH game is ε/2 similar the
Theorem 1.
Hence, the proof of Theorem 2 is completed. ut
Theorem 3: If multi-authority ABE is a secure
scheme, multi-authority ABEKS is an ABKS scheme
derived from multi-authority ABE, then multi-authority
ABKS is a secure ABKS under assumption that DBDH
or q-DDHI problem is intractable.
Theorem 4: If multi-authority ABE is a secure
authority unlinkable ABE when at most N-2 of au-
thorities are corrupted, then multi-authority ABKS is
a secure multi-authority ABKS under assumption that
XDH problem is intractable.
Paper Chow (2010) have proved that the multi-
authority ABE scheme is secure by Theorem 7.4 and
7.5. We can show that our scheme is also confidential
similar to the paper, the full proofs can be found in
the paper Chow (2010), so we do not prove the security
here in detail.
About the security keyword guessing attack, we add
public key and private key for the cloud server and the
data owner can re-encrypt the keyword ciphertext and
trapdoor in public channel. This guarantees only the
cloud server matches the keyword ciphertext and trap-
door. Our scheme can effectively prevent the guessing
attack by this approach.
5 Security and Performance Analysis
Basic operations are recorded as: Let U denotes number
of attributes, E denotes an exponentiation operation, P
is the basic operation of hash operations, e denotes a
pairing operation, k represents the maximum number
of trapdoor, q denote number of leaf node, f denotes
a polynomial operation, n denote number of node, M
denotes a multiplication operation in the group. Table 1
and Table 2 give us the comparison between our scheme
and the previous searchable encryption scheme. We use
Trap Ind, Ciph Ind, Anonymity to denote Trapdoor in-
distinguishability, Ciphertext indistinguishability, User
anonymity, Keyword guessing attack.
6 Conlusions
In order to overcome the disadvantages of tradition-
al attribute-based keyword search scheme in multi-
authority environment, this paper proposes a multi-
authority attribute searchable encryption scheme by
using bilinear on technique. By defining the data
security and user privacy, we have proved that the
scheme achieves attribute ciphertext indistinguishabil-
ity, trapdoor indistinguishability, user anonymity, key-
word guessing attack. Comparing with existing schemes,
our scheme supports the access control on the searching
result based upon fuzzy identity and elimates the
central authority in multi authority environment. It
is a suitable method for solving the practical prob-
lem which is described in the introduction. For the
encrypted personal health record system, the universe
of attributes can be partitioned into four disjoint sets
as {Medical Association Membership, Chief Physician,
Medical Researcher, Police}. Patients encrypt keywords
and messages specifying from the four disjoint sets, such
that only an authorized person who has adequate at-
tribute keys from four authorities {Medical Association,
Hospital, Scientific Research Institution and Public
Security Bureau} can search and decrypt the message
in cloud environment. Through the aforementioned
content, we can get that this proposed multi-authority
attribute searchable encryption scheme is a secure and
wide applicable protocol, and has a certain practical
value.
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Table 1 Security comparison
Boneh et al Baek et al Yang et al Our.
Trap Ind NO NO YES YES
Ciph Ind YES YES YES YES
Anonymity YES YES YES YES
KG NO NO YES YES
Table 2 Performance comparison
Boneh et al Baek et al Yang et al Our.
KeyGenServer - M - E
KeyGenReceiver E M 6E -
PEKS 2E+2P+e E+M+P+2e (2k+6)E M+(U+4)E+2P+e
Trapdoor E+P P+M 4f M+(n+2)E+2P
Test e+P M+e 2E+4f (q+1)e+2P+2E
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